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THE HIGHEST LAW
Do Poliee soDle1iDles prae1iee
••civil Disohedienee~~~ too?
by Prof. Yale Kamisar, University of Michigan Law School

In a recent address, Mr. Joseph
J. Casper, Assistant Director of the
FBI, asserted that "a society living
under the rule of law cannot permit
persons to choose the Jaws which they
will obey and the Jaws which they
will break." But on reading the rest
of his speech, one wonders whether
he would strenuously object if the
police were permitted to select the
laws which they must obey and those
they may disregard.
Mr. Casper stressed "the citizen's
individual responsibility of cultivating
a respect for the Jaw so deep and
constant that he becomes an example
for ail others to emulate," but one
wonders whether he felt nearly as
strongly about the law enforcement
officer's need to cultivate a respect for
the ·law so deep and constant that he
becomes an example for all.
Mr. Casper manages to be a good
deal less bedazzled by the mystique
of ."the law" when he comes up
agamst a law he does not like. He
protests, for example, that "criminals
are freed on technicalities despite the
fact that many of them are repeaters" and "some courts appear to be
more concerned with rewriting the
law than interpreting it."
I take it that when the Court sustains the power of the government to
"stop and frisk" on less than the traditional "probable cause" to • arrest
and search, Terry v. Ohio (1968), or
to deceptively place a secret informer
in the quarters and councils of the
defendant, Hoffa v. United States
October/November 1968

(1966), or to hide the identity of
an aileged informer on the issue of
"probable cause," McCray v. Illinois
( 1967) (why is it that the government's zeal for an unobstructed
"search for the truth" diminishes rapidly when one of its "privileges" constitutes the obstacle?), or to extract
blood over a suspect's protest,
Schmerber v. California ( 1966) or
from an unconscious person, Breithaupt v. Abram (1957), it is simply
"interpreting" or "applying" the Jaw.
I take it, on the other hand, that
whenever the Court decides a case
adversely to law enforcement (as its
officers see it), as when it applies
the right to counsel and the privilege
against self-incrimination to the police station as weil as the courtroom,
Miranda v. Arizona (1966), Escobedo v. Illinois, it is "making" or "rewriting" the ·law-or invoking mere
"technicalities."
(Who is to decide whether a constitutional right is a real right or only
a technicality? Each police officer?
Each police department? The FBI?)
"We must," Mr. Casper insists, "be
ailowed to enforce the law-ail Jaws
--every minute of every day of every
week of the year." But it is evident
that he feels somewhat differently
about the duty of the courts: "When
officers go before some courts they
know what to expect. First, they and
the prosecution will be tried. Guilt or
innocence of the accused is secondary
to matters of form. Was the defendant advised of all his rights? Was the
search legal?"
Apparently the courts, unlike the
police, are not supposed to enforce
ail the laws all the time. Indeed, Mr.
Casper seems to be saying that it
would be nice if the courts would
disregard some Jaws all the timethose he considers to be "bad Jaws"
from the viewpoint of law enforcement and dismisses as "technicalities"
or "matters of form."
But it is unclear who-if not the
highest court of the land-is to decide which constitutional rights are

real or important rights and which
are simply "technicalities" or "matters of form."
Mr. Casper is for calling "a spade
a spade." So am I. Although law ·enforcement spokesmen have frequently
preached that you cannot pick and
choose among good and bad laws,
according to each individual's or subgroup's concept of morality, without
destroying the whole concept of the
rule of law, too many of our Jaw
enforcement officers have engaged in
just such picking and choosing when
confronting "liberal" rules of procedure which might free persons who
"ought to be" punished.
They have practiced "civil disobedience," if you want to call it
that, to promote what they conceive
to be worthy causes. Although Mr.
Casper warns that "the first evidence
of each society's decay appeared in
the toleration of disobedience of its
laws and the judgments of its courts,"
too many police chiefs and prosecutors (and their "supporters") have
long tolerated, if not encouraged, disobedience of our Jaws and the judgments of our courts, which, in their
opinion, unduly obstruct them in
their pursuit of suspected criminals.
An example from the field of
search and seizure should suffice:
• When-six years before the U.S.
Supreme Court was to impose the
exclusionary rule on state courts as
a matter of federal constitutional law
-the Supreme Court of California
adopted the exclusionary rule on its
own in People v. Cahan, ( 1955),
Judge Traynor noted that police witnesses had freely admitted to making "numerous forcible entries and
searches without search warants."
"Thus," he observed:
[W]ithout fear of criminal punishment or other discipline, law enforcement officers, sworn to support the
[federal · and state] constitutions,
frankly admit their deliberate, fia~
grant acts in violation of both Constitutions and the laws enacted there(Continued on page 17)
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under. It is clearly apparent from
their testimony that they casually regard such acts as nothing more than
the performance of their ordinary
duties for which the city employs and
pays them.
As Judge Traynor stressed some
years later, prior to the imposition
of the exclusionary rule the courts
were condoning not "an occasional
constable's blunder," but a "routine
procedure" of "deliberate" and "flagrant" police illegality.
The police, of course, do not always frankly admit their misconduct.
They sometimes resort to perjury to
subvert "bad laws." As Profesor Irving Younger, a former federal prosecutor, recently observed in "The Perjury Routine," 3 Criminal Law Bulletin 551, 552 (1967):
For the first few months [after Mapp
v. Ohio], New York policemen continued to tell the truth about the circumstance.s of their searches, with the
result that evidence was suppressed.
Then the police made the gre'llt discovery that if the defendant drops the
narcotics on the ground, after which
the policeman arrests him, then the
search is reasonable and the evidence
is admissible. Spend a few hours in
the New York City Criminal Court
nowadays, and you will hear case
after case in which a policeman testifies that the defendant dropped the
rvarcotics on the ground, whereupon
the policeman arrested him. Usually
the very Language of the testimony is
identical from one case to another.
This is now known among defense
lawyers and prosecutors as "dropsy"
t~>rtimony.

The amicus brief of the N ationa! District Attorney's Association
(NDAA) in Miranda touched upon
the subject of police perjury in a
curious way. In urging the Supreme
Court not to require police interrogators to advise suspects of their rights,
the NDAA argued: "[B]y establishing
unworkable requirements do we not
further undermine and demoralize the
police officer, forcing him to 'stretch
the truth'?" The NDAA then called
the Court's attention to the experience of the English in the use of the
Judges' Rules, quoting from Devlin,
The Criminal Prosecution in England
47 ( 1960) : "It is difficult to say to
what extent the spirit of the Rules
is infringed because . . . it is the
general habit of the police never to
admit to the slightest departure from
correctness." (Emphasis supplied by
the NDAA Brief) . "A rule for a
rule's sake," the NDAA then warned
the Court, "is not the answer."
Why are so many law enforcement
officers so ready and willing to vioOctoberjNovember 1968

late or at ·least circumvent, laws that
cra~p their style? And to "stretch the
truth" in a court of law? I feel the
answer is because so many view
themselves as "soldiers" waging war
against the "criminal army"-and
all's fair in love and war.
As James Reston once pointed out,
"the more complicated life becomes,
the more people are attracted to
simple solutions.
It is not surprising that as the
"crime problem" grows more complex, baffling and frustrating, the
"war theory of crime control" becomes more attractive. But for the
last century at least there has never
been a time (according to the mass
media) when we weren't experiencing

If the Constitution forbids internal
war, then the Constitution is technical and pettifogging, and for its own
good it must be protected against itself. Its makers in any case could not
have foreseen the pass to which this
war has come. The law of war is the
law of necessity. ThereJ are certain
rules of war, but they do not strictly
bind, and atrocities are only to be deprecated because they may become
public and hurt the cause-not because the enemy is entitled to the
least consideration.
Not a few people are disturbed that
when criticism of the handling of the
Vietnam war touches a nerve, high
Administration officials snap back:
"Whose side are you on?" But I

a "crime crisis" nor a time when the
"war theory" lacked real appeal.
Indeed, the most incisive description of it I have ever read was written by an ex-crime reporter named
Ernest J. Hopkins in 1931 (Our Lawless Police 319) :
Being the enemy, he [the criminal,
or more accurately, the person accused or suspected of crime~ has no
rights worthy of the name. He is to
be met by the weapons of war. Individual rights, including those of
non-combatants, are subject to invasion like the rights of non-combatants
irt wartime. The policeman is a
peacetime soldier. If bullets go astray,
if civilians are inconvenienced, if civil
rights are suspended, those are accidenrfs inherent in a warfare that is
waged in crowded cities. Criminologists of the humanitarian class are to
be scorned, because they are the pacifists in this war. Defense attorneys are
to be frustrated and outwitted because
they are the enemy's diplomatic corps.
Citizens who would make objection
to the excess of authority indulged in
for the protection of the public are
giving aid and comfort to the enemy.

would hate to count the many times
law enforcement spokesmen have
as~ed their critics (sometimes subtly,
sometimes not so subtly) : "Whose
side are you on, the side of the law
and order-or the side of the rapist,
the dope peddler or the rioter?" Those
caught up in "a war" find it much
easier to question their critics' motivation than to answer their arguments.
Many law enforcement officials
reacted to public disclosures of widespread wiretapping and bugging in
government and industry, to the televised spectacle of Chicago police
clubbing unresisting demonstrators
and, a few years ago, to the dissemination of the gory details concerning
George Whitmore's discredited "confession" with the same animosity the
Pentagon felt toward the New York
Times and Harrison Salisbury for the
latter's dispatches from Hanoi on the
civilian deaths produced by our air
·
raids.
When you are fighting "a war"
(whether it be against the enemy
abroad or the "criminal army" at
(Continued on page 54)
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dence that a citizen has a correlative
duty for every right he possesses.
Long ago the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights put this obligation
squarely in the following words:
Each individual of the society has
a right to be protected by it in the enjoyment of his life, liberty, and property, according to standing laws. He
is obliged, consequently, to contribute
his share to the expense of his protection; to give his personal service or
an equivalent, when necessary.
Thus, both in law and fact, the fight
against crime and the keeping of the
public peace is the joint-obligation,
the mutual task, the common trust of
the ordinary citizen and the professional police officer. . . .
A basic civic obligation, which
ought to be self-evident but unfortunately is not, is the citizen's individual
responsibility of cultivating a respect
for the law so deep and constant that
he becomes an example for all others
to emulate.
This elementary attitude is just as
contagious as the unhealthy disregard
for law and contempt for authority of
all kinds which permeates our society
so widely today.
In America, the quest for truth is a
recognized and honored principle. It

is treasured as much as the freedoms
which make it possible. Our beliefs
and hopes rest on the premise that the
search for truth shall help to keep us
free.
Unfortunately, the search for truth
in some legal jurisdictions today is incidental to the skirmishes which occur
before and during trial. . . .
When officers go before some
courts they know what to expect.
First, they and the prosecution will
be tried. Guilt or innocence of the
accused is secondary to matters of
form.
Was the defendant advised of all
his rights? Was the search legal? Is
the "t" crossed and the "i" dotted?
Was the defendant's name spelled
correctly, and was the search warrant
valid? . . .
We need to take a long, hard look
at the administration of justice in this
country. It seems incongruous that
our system of criminal justice should
provide more and better protection
for the guilty than for law-abiding
citizens.
Criminals are freed on technicalities despite the fact that many of them
are repeaters. Some courts appear to
be more concerned with rewriting the
law than interpreting it.
What is law enforcement to do?
We have no choice. Our position is
clear. We are committed to seek the

truth under the rules laid down by the
courts.
One major need, however, is a
clear-cut set of operating rules.
The high courts take months to
reach a split decision on issues which
they require the policeman to decide
in a split-second.
Further, we also know that today's
law may not be tomorrow's law.
These changing conditions present a
continuing challenge to law enforcement.
Nevertheless, we must rise to the
demands of the hour. We must adopt
new methods that meet the tests established by the many new decisions we
face.
Aside from additional training and
equipment, higher standards and more
citizen cooperation, law enforcement
must avail itself of the highly developed scientific advancements which
are so vital to crime prevention and
solution. . . .
We cannot afford to accept conditions as they are in our country today.
We cannot afford to wait for someone
else to take a stand for right over
wrong and good over evil. We cannot
afford to sit placidly on the mountain
top of benevolent indifference and fiddle while would-be revolutionists put
a torch to a nation conceived in lib·
erty and built on the principles of
freedom and justice for all.
0
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home) , "the hiding of ugly facts
which the public 'might not understand' comes under the heading of
war propaganda." (Hopkins, supra at
320).
The late Chief Wiiiiam Parker of
Los Angeles, perhaps the nation's
most famous police chief, once maintained in a televised debate on wiretapping and electronic eavesdropping
that the police "are just like the U.S.
Army in Korea which is limited by
the Yalu River boundary, and the result of it is that they are losing the
war just like "we lost the war in Korea." Chief Parker invoked the military analogy more explicitly than do
most of his colleagues, but it is not
uncommon for law enforcement
spokesmen to grumble about search
and seizure, police interrogation and
other restrictions in much the manner our generals complain about the
"limitations" imposed on them.
Almost invariably, the day after a
"liberal" Supreme Court decision has
been handed down, e.g., McNabb
(1943), Mallory (1957), Jencks
(1957), Mapp (1961), Escobedo
(1964) , and Miranda (1966) , newspaper headlines and grief-stricken
law enforcement officers proclaim it
to be a "crippling"-if not a "death"

-blow. Yet almost invariably subsequent intensive studies, e.g., Medalie,
Leitz & Alexander, Custodial Police
Interrogation in Our Nation's Capital:
The Attempt to Implement Miranda,
66 Mich. L. Rev. 1347 (1968); Seeburger & Wettick, Miranda in Pittsburgh-A Statistical Study, 29 U.
Pitt. L. Rev. 1 ( 1967); Interrogations in New Haven: The Impact of
Miranda, 76 Yale L. J. 1519 (1967)
-reported in the back pages of the
newspapers if reported at all-reveal
that these expressions of horror and
dismay and predictions of doom were
grossly exaggerated.
In recent years there has been considerable alarm and agitation about
the "credibility gap" in the Whit,e
House and the Pentagon, but few
Americans indeed seem to have any
grasp of the dimensions of the "credibility gap" in many a police headquarters and district attorney's office.
As Justice Samuel Roberts of the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania recently pointed out in an address to
the trial judges of his state:
[I]f we crumpled the entire Bill
of Rights into a ball and threw it in
the ocean, robbery, rape and murder
would still stand tall on dry land; it
would be justice, not crime, that
would drown. Men do not read reports of litigation before they set out

to violate the law. But they do read
newspapers; and to the extent that
people in public life falsely cry out
that the courts of our land aid and
abet the lawless to the detriment of
society, these unwise utterances are
more likely to inspire criminal conduct than the very decision they deride.
As Ernest Hopkins pointed out 37
years ago, "crime is not war," but
"more nearly akin to disease in the
blood," and "get tough" tactics constitute a sorry attempt "to drive crime
back by hammering the external
sores." As Professor James Q. Wilson
recently observed, "perhaps the major
conclusion of the [President's Crime]
Commission-and, given its conservative membership, certainly its most
remarkable one-is that basically
crime can only be reduced by fundamental social changes." Wilson, A
Reader's Guide to the Crime Commission Reports, The Public Interest,
Fall 1967, pp. 64, 74.
It is no easy task, however, to refute the "devil theory" of social ills;
to shatter "the illusion of American
omnipotence"-the iiiusion, as D. w.
Brogan put it, "that any situation
which distresses or endangers the
United States can only exist because
some Americans have been fools or
knaves."
0
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